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1. Introduction 
 
Governance has reached India. The country that for a long time was governed by the 
idea of planned economic development and the necessity of a powerful and omni-
present government has been reinvented, as Corbridge and Harriss (2000) described 
the process. These authors have used this term to indicate that the previous model, 
which has never been fully implemented but functioned nevertheless as a powerful 
idea, has been replaced (partially) by a new model: market-led development, with a 
much smaller role for the state in development processes, and a much larger role for 
other actors. In other words, a shift from government to governance. 
The idea of governance, as Gopal Jayal and Pai (2001: 14-5) rightly stated, has 
different historical legacies. In the developed economies, it referred primarily to a 
changing political reality. New economic policies, cutbacks in the welfare state and 
critiques of bureaucratization led to new forms of public management. From a 
‘command-and-control’ organization, the state became an enabling regulator. Out-
contracting and agentification are just two of the main processes that can be 
witnessed. The discursive shift from government to governance can be seen as a 
response to these developments. 
In developing countries, however, the situation was different. The discourse 
“first landed on Southern shores as medicine prescribed by the good doctors of the 
Bretton Woods institutions, to remedy the laggard and inefficient development 
performance of these states” (Gopal Jayal and Pai, 2000: 14-15). As has been 
described already in the introduction to this book, for the World Bank and other 
international donors, governance became a convenient discursive mechanism to deal 
with issues of public management without giving a major role and responsibility to 
(often allegedly corrupt and inefficient) government institutions, and, moreover, to do 
so in a seemingly a-political fashion. 
India, however, is not a ‘Southern shore’ like any other. As compared to many 
other developing countries, the reform process started late, and once it started, it was 
not only or primarily a process set in motion by outside actors. As is well 
documented, India faced an acute balance of payment crisis in 1991. The ‘Bretton 
Woods doctors’ were indeed ready to prescribe their stabilization and adjustment 
programmes in exchange for loans. But apart from these external agencies, there were 
also powerful domestic actors and forces that lobbied and pushed for a reform agenda 
and a different role of the government in economic development. 
Almost two decades later, India has, indeed, been ‘reinvented’. Instead of 
being associated with rural poverty, India is now associated with a booming 
Information Technology sector and an increasingly expanding middle class that 
consumes and behaves like elites and middle classes elsewhere in the world. The so-
called ‘Hindu rate of growth’ (Krishna Raj, 1973) has given way to growth figures 
approaching those of China. Instead of a ‘licence Raj’ regulating most economic 
activities and transactions, India is now a major player in the global economy, with 
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Indian companies buying up European steel industries or car factories. India is 
‘unbound’, as one of the supporters has described the process.1 
This paper tries to describe and explain this transition from a state-led 
development ideology to a market-led model, from an idea that the state is the main 
actor in economic development to an idea of the state as facilitator, from government 
as a central regulatory authority to new forms of public management that include 
different actors in public-private partnerships, decentralized forms of governance and 
out-sourcing arrangements. The paper will argue that this transition has to be 
understood against the background of changes in class relations that had happened 
already before 1991 and that were further reinforced in the reform era. The opposition 
against the new economic policies has been weak, partly because some powerful 
groups could benefit but also because large categories of people who did not 
immediately benefit could consider themselves as potential beneficiaries in the long 
run. Initially, there was also opposition against some of the governance reforms from 
within political circles and the bureaucracy itself, but this has subsided. This, I will 
argue, has to do with the fact that despite many rhetorical changes, there were several 
important features of the Indian polity that have remained basically intact. The 
argument will, hence, be that the mode of governance that has replaced the earlier 
state-led model is a hybrid one (as the earlier one, in fact also was). It is based on a 
new ideology and contains new elements, but, in actual practice, less has changed that 
what is claimed. Ironically, it is this mixture of continuity and change that has 
diffused opposition and paved the way for some of the governance reforms that have, 
indeed, taken place. 
 This chapter starts with a short interpretation of the Nehruvian model of the 
state and how this was replaced by a new concept. The third section explains this shift 
against the background of India’s changing political economy. The fourth section 
discusses what has really happened ‘on the ground’. This section focuses on one south 
Indian state, Andhra Pradesh, which has been at the forefront of the reform process 
between 1995 and 2004. The paper ends with a short conclusion. 
 
 
2. From Planning to Governance 
 
In order to understand the Nehruvian model of development, it is important to go back 
to the origins of India’s democracy. As we know now, India became a constitutional 
parliamentary democracy after achieving Independence in 1947. In the course of time, 
this feature has become self-evident, natural, as if it could not have been otherwise. 
But this, as Khilnani (1997) reminds us, was not true. In fact, India was not 
particularly well-prepared for democracy. “Huge, impoverished, crowded with 
cultural and religious distinctions, with a hierarchical social order almost deliberately 
designed to resist the idea of political equality, India had little prospective reason to 
expect it could operate as a democracy” (Khilnani, 1997: 16). 
Moreover, in the years preceding Independence, different competing visions co-
existed and were debated. Mahatma Gandhi’s ideal was that the village would be the 
main political unit, with only a very small role for a central state. Sardar Patel 
preferred a more hierarchical authoritarian state, reflecting existing social relations 
within Indian society, while Jawaharlal Nehru favoured a centralized parliamentary 
democracy comparable to the Westminster model. Eventually Nehru won, but the 
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victory was “precarious and partial…it persuaded few outside intellectuals and 
English-speaking circles, and it could never rely on the support of any powerful 
group” (Khilnani, 1997: 34).2  
What is important in the context of this chapter is that democracy in India was not 
the result of a mass demand of the people; it was not the product of an emerging 
bourgeoisie demanding democratic rights (Barrington Moore, 1966). Rather, it was 
the political choice of an intellectual elite (Khilnani, 1997: 34) that won the 
ideological battle, partly helped by historical coincidence.
3
 
The contradictions that were the result of this history, were at the time clearly 
expressed by Ambedkar, the main author of the Indian Constitution and leader of the 
‘untouchable’ castes, when he said that  
On the 26th January 1950, we are going to enter a life of contradictions. In 
politics, we will have equality, and in social and economic life we will have 
inequality. In politics we will be recognising the principle of one man, one vote, 
one value. In our social and economic life we shall, by reason of our social and 
economic structure, continue to deny the principle of one man, one value. How 
long shall we continue to live this life of contradictions? How long shall we 
continue to deny equality in our social and economic life? If we continue to deny 
it for long, we do so only by putting our political democracy in peril. (quoted from 
Khilnani, 1997: 35). 
Given the huge social and economic inequalities, how could political equality be 
achieved? In the absence of a broad-based reform movement, where could the push 
for social and economic change come from? There was almost no other alternative 
then that the state would have to play a major role in the required development. Using 
Gramsci’s work, the Indian political scientists Sudipta Kaviraj and Partha Chatterjee 
have referred to this process as a ‘passive revolution’. In the absence of a bourgeois 
hegemony, social transformation was sought “through bureaucratic rather than 
mobilizational form” (Kaviraj, 1994: 60). Or, in other words, “It is by means of an 
interventionist state, directly entering the domain of production as mobilizer and 
manager of investable ‘national’ resources that the foundations are laid for 
industrialization and the expansion of capital” (Chatterjee, 1993: 212). The state 
became the main actor entrusted with the responsibility to lead and guarantee 
economic development and social transformation. The result was a huge state-
controlled sector and a powerful planning apparatus. 
The ideology of state-led development as well as the practice of an enormous 
public sector responsible for growth and welfare can thus be understood against the 
background of an emerging democracy with reformist aspirations but without a 
bourgeois movement or other forms of social mobilisation that could lead or push this 
development. 
 The first three Plan periods (1950-1965) were relatively successful, but then 
the Indian economy started to stagnate. Poverty was also still a major problem. From 
the mid-sixties onwards, the Green Revolution resulted in agrarian growth in certain 
regions and the rise a class of capitalist farmers who became a politically powerful 
category of people in several Indian states. The result, as Bardhan (1984) described, 
was a coalition of three dominant proprietary classes (the industrial capitalists, rich 
farmers and white-collar workers), engaged in several conflicts with each other about 
subsidies and (illegal) rents, resulting in economic stagnation and policy deadlocks. 
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From the 1970s onwards, some economists started to question the idea of planned 
development, pointing out the inefficiencies emerging from controls and protection.
4
 
 There have been several initiatives in the seventies and eighties to move away 
somewhat from planning, and to reduce the role of the public sector. When Rajiv 
Gandhi came to power in 1984, there was a short-lived ‘half-hearted’ (Harriss, 1987) 
attempt to liberalize the economy. Several political analysts at that time concluded 
that given the democratic set-up that allowed opposition to mobilize fairly easily, it 
was apparently very difficult to reform the Indian economy and to redefine the role of 
the state (Harriss, 1987; Kohli, 1989; Manor, 1987). 
 As the events after 1991 have shown, these analyses were mistaken. Although 
more gradual than in some African or Latin American countries, the Indian economy 
has undergone a major reform process in the nineties, and the role of the state in 
economic and social development has significantly altered. Banks have been 
liberalized; industries previously reserved for the public sector (electricity, 
telecommunications) have been opened up; agricultural trade has been liberalized; 
there has been a liberalization of imports and exports; there has been privatisation or 
disinvestments in some public sector enterprises; the insurance sector has been 
reformed; planning as an economic instrument has lost much of its importance; 
massive private initiative in health and education has diminished the role of the state. 
 These reforms have contributed to high rates of economic growth. They have 
also contributed to an expansion and increasing importance of an urban middle class 
and to a new concept of development. Large dams or steel factories are no longer the 
symbols of progress; they have been replaced by cars, mobile phones and shopping 
malls. Probably most noteworthy in the context of this book, the reforms have 
transformed the very idea of the role of the state. The normative model that has 
acquired dominance since 1991 is one of a slimmed down, effective and efficient, 
partly decentralised
5
 state that is no longer involved in economic activities that can be 
undertaken by the private sector, but that takes responsibility for regulating the private 
sector, enabling and facilitating private initiatives, that relies and collaborates with 
private and non-governmental parties, and that protects the weaker sections in society. 
In other words, responsible governance that allows the private sector to flourish has 
replaced command and control. 
 
 
3. Processes behind the ‘Reinvention’ 
 
It is an intriguing question why this shift could take place in the nineties, especially 
since earlier efforts failed. There is an extensive body of literature on the politics of 
the reform process, which I have reviewed elsewhere (Mooij, 2004). Here, I will only 
highlight some of the contributions to the debate. 
 According to Rob Jenkins (1999), the introduction of the reforms are an 
example of clever political management, facilitated by helpful features of some 
political institutions. Reforms, he argued, were introduced by stealth. Indian 
politicians used several underhand and often non-transparent tactics. They were 
confident that the reform would not fundamentally alter either the political arena or 
their privileged position. Interest groups would continue to remain malleable, and new 
coalitions would emerge. Two types of institutions were particularly highlighted by 
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Jenkins: namely, federal and political party institutions. The effect of the federal 
system has been the diffusion of opposition, while political parties functioned as 
networks of influence that could be used by politicians when negotiating policies and 
accommodating interests. In short, India’s democracy did not create a hurdle; on the 
contrary, the actual functioning of the main ‘democratic’ institutions enabled 
reformers to develop their clandestine tactics to introduce the reforms without 
encountering much opposition. 
 This explanation focuses particularly on issues of implementation, but does 
not address the reform agenda itself. Where does the new concept of the role of the 
state come from; why could it become a powerful idea; why did the communist 
parties not oppose the liberalisation agenda?  
 The latter question can perhaps be explained by Varshney’s distinction 
between mass and elite politics (Varshney, 1999). In the 1990s, mass politics in India 
centered around identity issues. Following the 1991 elections, the Hindu nationalist 
Bharatya Janata Party (BJP) had become the second largest political party in the 
country after Congress (I). It had played a key role in the movement for the 
demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya and in the Hindu–Muslim riots that 
subsequently broke out in several parts of the country. Along with the issue of job 
reservation for lower castes, this had led to mass politics centering around social and 
communal identities. This, according to Varshney, had consequences for the way 
political parties realigned in parliament. “Coalitions were increasingly formed against 
Hindu nationalists, not against the Congress. To begin with, the left – the Communists 
and the lower caste Janata Dal and its allies – disliked the reforms, but they disliked 
Hindu nationalism even more” (ibid.: 247; italics in original). Subsequent budget 
proposals could get passed by Parliament – not because the opposition parties were in 
favour, but because Hindu–Muslim relations and caste animosities had become the 
prime determinants of political coalitions (ibid.: 248). 
 Moreover, according to Shastri (1997), the reconceptualisation of the role of 
government did not start in 1991, but much earlier in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
when various committees headed by senior administrators who were more market-
friendly than their predecessors wrote their policy reports. These ideas were further 
developed during the Rajiv Gandhi regime. Although many of the policy ideas could 
not be implemented, the ideological orientation of the key decision-makers and 
economic advisors continued to change. This process was helped by the entry of the 
so-called ‘laterals’ within the bureaucracy, who are usually relatively young, trained 
outside India (often in the United States), and possibly with prior professional 
experience in the World Bank or in the academic world. When faced with the 
hierarchy and rigidity of the Indian bureaucracy, these laterals became reformers 
almost by default. Thus, the reform discourse grew in strength, and when the 
‘windows of opportunity’ opened in 1991, the plans were ready for implementation. 
 The limitation of these explanations is that they focus primarily on processes 
within the state itself, while, as S.K. Das (2005) showed, there was also considerable 
opposition within the state. Das, himself a member of the Indian Administrative 
Service, describes how initially, the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) was against 
the reform process. The reforms seemed to initiate the end of the licence raj; 
discretionary powers would diminish and there would be a higher degree of insulation 
between IAS personnel and market participants. While a small number of senior IAS 
supported the reform ideology, a much larger number, according to Das, feared that 
the reforms would erode their position of command and control versus the private 
sector. It was only from 1997–98 onwards that they became reform-minded, i.e., after 
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it had become clear that the process could be manipulated in such a way that it posed 
no threat at all.   
 A more comprehensive account has to take wider social and class relations, 
and changes therein into account. There were, of course, important geo-political 
developments: the late 1980s had witnessed the end of the Cold War and the break-up 
of the Soviet Union. There was also international pressure of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank to introduce structural adjustment policies. But 
more importantly, structural transformations had taken place within India’s political 
economy. 
 First of all, Indian industry and business have undergone a ‘quiet revolution’ 
in the 1980s (Pederson, 2000). The modern sections within business (engineering, 
electronics, software, computers, etc.) have grown and become more prominent. In 
contrast to some of the older business groups, these modern sections favour de-
regulation, de-control and de-licensing. They have organized themselves in the 
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). This confederation has been fairly successful 
in developing close ties with the Finance Ministry and other policy makers. It 
participates actively in public debates around the economic reform, and has been able 
to influence the economic policy agenda. So, Pedersen’s argument is that the rise of 
this new group of industrial entrepreneurs, in economic as well as in political terms, 
“constituted the key social change that was necessary for the reforms to be carried 
through” (Pedersen, 2000: 276).6  
 Secondly, over time, there have been important shifts in the overall class 
structure of India. At the time of Independence, there was a very small elite, and a 
huge mass of poor people. Partly as a result of the various Nehruvian policies as well 
as the Green Revolution, this has changed and a considerable middle class has 
emerged. This, as Sridharan (2004: 405) stated, has political implications. “The elite-
mass class cleavage tended to support a broadly socialistic ideology, while the elite-
middle-mass differentiation has created a broader base for capitalism – hence the 
increased support for economic liberalization”. Reality is, of course, more complex 
than this quote suggests, but there is no doubt that the middle class has been a 
staunch, and perhaps increasingly staunch supporter of the liberalisation process. 
Diverse and internally fragmented as it may be, and even though it is still by all 
accounts a minority (and elite part) of the population, it has become ‘the moral 
majority’ (Deshpande 2006). It occupies a hegemonic position insofar as it represent 
what India wants to be in the twenty first century: educated, upwardly mobile, 
modern. 
 Even though there are fractions within the middle class that do not benefit 
from liberalisation (for instance public sector workers who are faced with 
retrenchments), the middle class as a whole has identified with the liberalisation 
process. In fact, there is also surprisingly little opposition from lower classes, who are 
often excluded from the new consumption patterns and life styles that have become 
normal among the middle class. Fernandes (2006) explains this in terms of 
‘intertemporal interpretation’. In her view, “an anticipation of future benefits mediates 
the immediacy of political opposition” (Fernandes, 2006: xx). The promise of 
liberalisation is that it will benefit eventually everybody. This process is very visible, 
indeed. En masse, poor people have started to see themselves as the potential middle 
class of the future. This is evident, for instance, in the enormous popularity of 
English-medium private education, in which poor people are willing to invest a lot, 
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assuming that it might be a major gateway towards upward social mobility (Mooij and 
Tawa Lama-Rewal, forthcoming). 
 
 
4. Governance Reforms in Andhra Pradesh 
 
The next question to be addressed relates to changes that are taking place in actual 
practices. The model may have changed from planning to governance, but to what 
extent have new modes of governance been realized? Given the size of India, this 
section focuses on just one State within India, Andhra Pradesh, in which I have done 
fieldwork on governance reforms between 2000 and 2004.
7
 
 Andhra Pradesh (AP), a south Indian State with approximately 80 million 
inhabitants, is an interesting state to study governance reforms. When India started to 
liberalize its economy after 1991, Andhra Pradesh followed suit, but in a slow and 
modest way. However, since the mid-nineties, the AP State government has become 
one of the main advocates of the Indian reform process. Between 1995 and 2004, AP 
was ruled by a dynamic and reform-oriented Chief Minister, Chandrababu Naidu. AP 
became the first State that negotiated an independent loan from the World Bank.
8
 
While in several other States reforms were implemented by stealth (Jenkins, 1999), 
the AP State government under Naidu made a point of advertising itself as reformist. 
It is probably partly for that reason that Andhra Pradesh became almost a darling State 
of several international donors – they liked the unconcealed commitment to the 
reform process that was almost daily expressed by the political leadership.  
 Among the many claims of the AP government between 1995 and 2004, there 
were a few important ones that referred to governance. The AP leadership claimed it 
wanted to improve the performance of the administration, to enhance accountability 
and transparency, and to keep politics away from policy implementation. It coined the 
term SMART governance to refer to these objectives, where SMART stands for 
simple, moral, accountable, responsive and transparent. A taskforce on Good 
Governance was set up and a White Paper on ‘Governance and Public Management’ 
was brought out which discussed many goals and initiatives. In 2000, Naidu published 
a book in which he wrote that “both old-style politics and old-style governance have 
to change …. At the heart of the administrative reform we are attempting is the 
change in the role for the government from being an actor, to enabler and facilitator” 
(Naidu and Ninan: 10-12). According to Naidu, there were major problems with the 
administration. “The machinery which attempts to run the state needs and urgent 
overhaul itself. It is huge and self-perpetuating. It is slow and accountable to nobody. 
Above all, it is obstructive. It essentially exists for itself, not for the public” (p. 45). 
Corruption was seen as an enormous problem. In his view, there was “too much 
politicking and too little governance” (p. 17).  
 The most prominent governance reform efforts were the following. First, there 
was a strategic effort to create an economic climate favourable to private investments. 
The government established two industrial parks around the capital city of AP (one 
for software and computer industries; the other for pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
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industry). It provided specialised infrastructure, offered provisions for capital subsidy, 
tax rebates and exemptions from certain types of legislations. Furthermore, the power 
sector was de-bundled and partly privatised. In the social sector, there was a massive 
expansion of private health and education facilities, also stimulated by the 
government.  
Second, there was an effort to increase stakeholder participation in 
development efforts. ‘Make a stakeholder of every citizen’ became a slogan of the AP 
government. Self-help groups (such as women thrift societies) and local-level user 
groups and committees were established in many areas. Stakeholder participation was 
also an important characteristic of the flagship rural development programme 
(Janmabhoomi, literally land of one’s birth) introduced by Naidu. 
A third set of governance reforms was related to the introduction of e-
governance.  The chief minister himself strongly believed that information technology 
could help in improving service delivery, accountability and transparency and in 
reducing corruption.
9
. E-service centres were created in urban areas. These were 
multi-purpose centres where citizens can pay telephone and electricity bills, get 
licences and pay municipal taxes. The Registration Department was computerized, 
enabling electronic registration of property transfers and other transactions.  
A fourth governance reform effort was the introduction of performance targets 
for individuals and institutions, ‘governing for result’, as it was coined. Naidu 
introduced monthly performance assessments of the bureaucracy, at individual and 
institutional level. Long schedules with numerous indicators had to be filled in at all 
levels in order to monitor progress and inform the higher officials and Chief Minister. 
The popularity and progress of the government was further assessed occasionally by 
independent agents and through ongoing public perceptions studies. 
 Some of these efforts have been quite successful. For instance, many industrial 
companies have set up their offices and industries in Hyderabad. These include some 
major international companies. Microsoft, for instance, has a campus in Hyderabad, 
which was the company’s first campus in India and its biggest outside the US. 
Software exports from AP have increased from Rs. 0.6 billion in 1995-96 to Rs. 185 
billion in 2007-08.
10
 AP accounts for 10 per cent of the software exports in India, and 
Hyderabad is a major player. The e-service centres are also examples of successful 
initiatives. They are very much appreciated by the urban citizens, who can now settle 
bills and do other routine jobs at just one counter.  
Other governance reforms, however, did not achieve the official objectives or 
had some unfavourable side effects. The computerization of the Registration 
Department, for instance, did not lead to a decrease in corruption, as Caseley (2003) 
has documented. ‘Governing for Results’ went overboard with its targets and the 
necessity to report progress at monthly intervals. There was widespread manipulation 
with figures, stimulated by higher officials who wanted to show that their district 
performed well.
11
 The involvement of stakeholder groups in policy making shows a 
mixed picture. There was a massive expansion of women self-help groups, but many 
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of them did not function very well. User groups were formed in multiple areas such as 
irrigation, forestry, watershed development, education, health, but in most sectors the 
influence of stakeholders on management decisions remained marginal.
12
 
 As with all (successful or unsuccessful) policy interventions, it is important to 
assess the reforms not only against their official objectives and intentions, but also 
more broadly: what is it that these reforms actually do; what kind of developments do 
they allow to happen? The first thing to mention here is that the governance reforms 
were used by the political leadership to develop a political image and identity. 
Naidu’s predecessor was a populist and charismatic film star-cum-politician. When 
Naidu took over in 1995, he had to find a way to come out of the shadow of his 
predecessor and to become a leader in his own right. He found this image in computers, 
technology and modern management. He orchestrated a considerable amount of 
publicity around his person, stressing especially his commitment to reform, good 
governance, hard work, his modern outlook, etc. He succeeded in attracting international 
attention, both from industrialists (Bill Gates), as well as donor organizations. In other 
words, governance rhetoric and reforms helped Naidu to build an image within the State 
and to create legitimacy in the international arena. 
 A second point worth mentioning is that, in actual practice, many of the 
governance reforms contributed to a further centralization of power in the person of 
Naidu himself. In a sense, such centralization was not new. The Telugu Desam Party 
(TDP, Naidu’s party) has always been dominated by one leader. Naidu gave, however, a 
new twist to this centralization. According to one observer, Naidu “is not a 
‘commandist’, since he sees plenty of scope for the private sector and does not wish the 
government to dominate everything. But he seeks personal dominance of nearly 
everything within the reach of the government. So, he offers not ‘commandism’ but 
‘control freakery’” (Manor, 2004: 273-4). He had surrounded himself with a small 
number of like-minded often hand-picked people within the bureaucracy. Ministers, 
barring a few, were fairly marginalized. The establishments of targets and frequent 
performance assessments functioned as an instrument in this centralization. Regular 
videoconferences were held, during which senior district officials had to report to the 
Chief Minister. Districts that had achieved their targets were praised; others were 
publicly reprimanded. At the district level, many financial powers were shifted from 
sectoral departments to the district commissioners – to whom the Chief Minister had 
direct access.
13
 
 A third effect of the governance reforms was the further development of the 
Telugu Desam Party at the local level. According to Powis (2003), Naidu’s efforts to 
involve stakeholders should be understood first and foremost as a political strategy: the 
stakeholder groups functioned as arrangements in which new rural leaders could 
emerge and be accommodated. In addition, the establishment of stakeholder groups 
has contributed to the further development of a ‘contractor-raj’ at the local level. Since 
stakeholder groups were often dominated by (aspirant) local TDP leaders, and since they 
were often made responsible for the selection of contractors who could do the work (e.g. 
build an additional classroom in a school), funds were often used to maintain coalitions 
of political support and favouring TDP-affiliated contractors (Nayak et al., 2002). There 
were “tremendous personal benefits to those who are part of the implementing 
machinery … [and in] return these people have acted as mobilisers during election time 
and generated party interests at other times” (Nayak et al., 2002: 40). While previously 
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contractors and middlemen could be independent of political parties, the fact that new 
TDP dominated bodies were made responsible for the distribution of funds made the 
‘contractor class’ enter into politics, often as TDP associates. 
A fourth point to make is that the governance reforms did not lead to a 
reduction in populism. Despite the change in policy rhetoric (from welfare to 
development; from hand-outs to self-help), the regime continued to be populist. The 
Janmabhoomi (rural development) scheme differed in its concept from some of the 
earlier development schemes in the sense that it is based on empowerment, self-help 
and stakeholders, while some earlier schemes draw upon a ‘donative discourse’.14 
Nevertheless, it is populist in nature and partly meant to secure vote banks. Moreover, 
apart from these ‘modern’ stakeholder-based schemes, there continued to be a 
plethora of more traditional populist schemes meant for specific target groups (rural 
women people of traditional occupations, religious minorities, scheduled castes). 
Especially during election time, Naidu was, as Suri (2005:147) put it, ‘[l]ike a 
political wizard, (…) [pulling] out one welfare scheme after another from his hat’. In 
actual practice, many of these schemes suffered from lack of funds or poor 
implementation. They did, however, have a function in diffusing opposition to the 
regime and in reproducing a support base at the local level (although the trick did no 
longer seem to work in the 2004 elections). 
 To conclude this section, it is clear that governance modalities have changed in 
Andhra Pradesh. As the governance agenda prescribes, the AP government has, indeed, 
become more of a facilitator and less of a central actor in economic development. It has 
started to play, and is still playing, a major role in enabling and stimulating private 
initiatives in various sectors. At the same time, however, the system of ‘old-style 
politics’ did not change, or was even reinforced. The regime continued to be populist, 
and party building remained a prime concern. In fact, perhaps the main reason behind 
the introduction of stakeholder groups was exactly that it provided a way to strengthen 
the ruling party at the local level. Party building in India requires money and usually 
involves the (illegal) diversion of development funds. This, indeed, continued to happen 
in AP during Naidu’s regime on a massive scale.15 So, yes, certain parts of the 
governance agenda have, indeed, been rather successfully implemented, but in other 
areas, what happened under the label of ‘governance reforms’ has helped to reproduce a 
regime characterized by a powerful populist leader, party brokerage in implementation 
and corruption. 
 
 
5. By Way of Conclusion 
 
To conclude, this paper has discussed changes that have taken place in India with 
regard to public management. The earlier model, of a planned economy with a large 
role for the state has been replaced by a post-Washington-model: governance instead 
of government; facilitation instead of command and control. The paper has analyzed 
how this change could happen. It argued that the shift has to be understood against the 
background of larger transformations in India’s political economy, in particular shifts 
within the class of industrial capitalists, and the expansion of a middle class. Although 
the reforms are biased in favour of particular categories of people, there has been 
surprisingly little opposition. This, I have argued was partly because the main political 
                                                 
14
 See Schaffer (1984) about donative versions of reality. 
15
 See, for instance, Deshingkar et al (2005) for an analysis of mass diversion of funds in the Food-for-
Work programme in 2001-2. 
 11 
parties in the 1990s had some other major concerns (the rise of identity politics) and 
partly because many people who are so far excluded have started to see themselves 
(or their children) as potential beneficiaries in the future. 
 The paper continued to discuss the practice of governance reforms in one 
Indian State, Andhra Pradesh between 1995 and 2004. Ideas about governance 
reforms were used by a reform-oriented political leader to strengthen his image within 
Andhra Pradesh and outside. The role of the state has, indeed, become much more 
that of a facilitator of private initiative, rather than that of an economic actor in its 
own right. At the same time, some of the governance reforms have also helped to 
reproduce or even reinforce some characteristics of the polity that they were meant to 
redress. They offered new avenues for aspirant local leaders; they provided ways for 
distributing development funds and for keeping these under the control of the ruling 
party; they did not diminish illegal diversion of funds. This is what the governance 
reforms – also – really entailed. 
 There was, hence, no real break with the past. New forms of governance have 
been introduced, but ‘old forms’ of public management have not ceased to exist. It is 
this combination of old and new that made that also powerful ‘vested interests’ that 
could have felt threatened by the reforms did not feel the need to oppose them. After 
all, in the end, ‘politics as usual’ could continue (Jenkins, 1999; S.K. Das, 2005).  
 Nevertheless, ‘real governance’ is characterized by important contradictions. 
This was the case in Andhra Pradesh, but perhaps this is equally true in other 
contexts. As is already mentioned in the introduction of this book, the concept of 
governance de-politicizes; it is assumed that governance is an a-political form of 
public management. Political leaders like Naidu have even presented governance as a 
strategy against politics. The politics of this anti-politics is, however, evident. In its 
most basic form, governance is a form of public management that gives ample scope 
for the private sector to develop and even co-govern. In concrete cases, like the one 
discussed in this paper, governance is even a straightforward political instrument to 
further empower an already autocratic political leader and strengthen the ruling party. 
At some point, one might expect, this contradiction becomes hard to sustain, and 
regimes claiming to pursue a governance agenda might be judged by the standards 
they have introduced themselves.
16
 Perhaps that could be the welcome start of a new 
discussion about desirable forms of public management – a discussion that would 
confront the political choices and dilemmas more explicitly. 
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